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LIABILITY OF AIRCRAFT OWNERS AND
OPERATORS FOR GROUND INJURY
By WILLIAM C. WOLFF
Seton Hall University Law School
This paper recently brought to its author the Braniff Essay Award
in Aviation Law, an annual award in memory of the late Thomas E.
Braniff, airline pioneer, established by Roger J. Whiteford and
Hubert A. Schneider of the law firm of Whiteford, Hart, Carmody
and Wilson, Washington, D. C.
I. INTRODUCTION
A VIATION has developed from an oddity to an industry in the past
two score years. During this interval of time it has been definitely
established that there are relative rights of aircraft and landowners in
the superjacent airspace' and that low flights by aircraft may violate
a landowner's rights as well as actual contact with the earth's surface.2
This writing is not concerned with what legal elements constitute a
tort or whether or not a particular event caused by an aircraft is a
tortious act. The main purpose of this study is to determine the
theories of legal liability, and the statutory and common law principles
that enter into the judicial determination of the aircraft owner's obli-
gations for injuries and damages caused by this new instrumentality
of transportation upon the surface of the earth. This study will encom-
pass only accidents caused by flights over the United States by aircraft
owned by citizens of the United States.
In the future, air transportation portends to be a far more influen-
tial factor in modern living so that it is logically to be expected that
the legal contacts will also multiply. What are the legal obligations
of an aircraft owner for injuries that his aircraft has committed upon
ground objects and persons? Does his liability change depending upon
the state wherein the injury occurred? Further, why should there be
a basic difference in law among the various states? With the rapid
development in the aviation field these problems should take on ever
greater significance; therefore it is important that this subject be
investigated.
1 J. A. Eubank, The Right of Air Flight, 58 Dick. L. Rev. 141 (1954) "Every
state in the union by express terms or clear implication has given legal force to the
concept of right of flight. Navigation of the airspace is an absolute existing right.
The right of flight is an inherent natural right. Aerial navigation is universally
recognized and practiced. Its very existence is for the general enrichment of man-
kind and the development and advancement of civilization."
2 U. S. v. Causby, 328 U. S. 256 (1945); Leisy v. U. S., 102 F. Supp. 789
(D. Minn. 1952).
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II. THE LIABILITY OF AIRCRAFT OWNERS FOR GROUND DAMAGE
The liability for damage to property and for injuries caused by
aircraft contact with the earth's surface has been the source of much
diverse litigation within the various states. Whether or not the owner
of the aircraft has any duty towards the inhabitants on the ground for
the damages inflicted by an airplane that he owns, depends upon the
theory of liability that is adopted in the particular state where the
airplane causes the damage.
There are two major categories into which the liability for surface
damage by aircraft is separable; absolute liability and land rules of
tort and negligence.
A. Absolute Liability
The theory of absolute liability is founded in the common law and
in the statutes.
1. Non-Statutory Liability
The jurisdictions that apply absolute liability without statute use
two concepts in holding the aircraft owner absolutely liable. The one
concept of absolute liability is under the theory of trespass,3 the other
t' is under the proposition that air flight is an ultrahazardous activity. 4
(a) Trespass
Under the theory of trespass the owner is liable because of the
doctrine of respondeat superior.5 It is therefore necessary that there be
established either a master-servant or a principal-agent relationshipbetween the owner and the pilot.6 Further, it is necessary that the
servant be acting within the scope of his employment at the time the
injury occurs, since the doctrine is inapplicable where the injury
occurs while a servant is acting outside the legitimate scope of his
authority.7 Non-statutory absolute liability on the basis of an action
in trespass will not excuse the pilot, even though it permits the owner
to escape absolute liability himself because of the common law defensq.8
The pilot, even though he is without fault, is held strictly liable for
the damages resulting from his own trespass. New York is the chief
exponent of the theory of absolute liability for damages from trespass
without fault. As early as 1822 (the earliest aircraft case in the United
3 Rochester Gas and Electric Co. v. Dunlop, 148 Misc. 849, 266 N. Y. Supp. 469
(1933); Margosian v. U. S. Airlines, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 464 (S.D. N.Y. 1955); Hahn
v. U. S. Airlines, Inc. 127 F. Supp. 950 (S.D. N.Y. 1954).
4 Parcell v. U. S., 104 F. Supp. 110 (S.D. W.Va. 1951).
5 Margosian v. U. S. Airlines, Inc. 127 F. Supp. 464 (S.D. N.Y. 1955).
6 D'Aquilla v. Pryor, 122 F. Supp. 346 (S.D. N.Y. 1954) where the court
applied New York law which imposes absolute liability for damages resulting from
trespass without fault but held that owner is not liable for negligence of an inde-
pendent pilot.
7 Riveer v. Thornton, 202 Okla. 96, 210 P. 2d 366 (1949) where the court held
it was a fact for the jury whether the pilot at the time of collision with a tractor
on a field was a servant of owner of aircraft acting in scope of employment.
8 King v. U. S., 178 F. 2d 320 (5th Cir. 1949) where an intoxicated Air Force
Cadet took a plane aloft without permission and crashed it into a house. The court
held that as the cadet was on a frolic of his own and not acting as a servant, the
United States was not liable.
LIABILITY FOR GROUND INJURY
States) the court required that the pilot of a balloon compensate the
owner of land on which the balloon landed causing damage that
amounted to fifteen dollars. However, seventy-five dollars in additional
damage ensued when the crowd trampled on the grounds, and the pilot
was held responsible for all damages that the landowner sustained.9
New York has not deviated in this rule of absolute liability for trespass
since 1822,10 and although the pilot is always responsible as a matter of
law,1' New York permits the owner to escape liability if he has a
common law defense as
"The law of this state does not impose any absolute liability on
airplane owners as it does on automobile owners by statute.' 2
Non-statutory absolute liability under the theory of trespass is
therefore not all-embracing and may prevent the plaintiff from reach-
ing the party that can financially satisfy his claim. The owner is much
more likely in the normal situation to be in a position to pay a judg-
ment rendered against him than a non-owner pilot.13
The concept of absolute liability of owners and operators of aircraft
for damages to ground victims resulting from flight has three bases
which the common law applies to novel situations.'
4
First, absolute liability is enforced because of the inherently great
danger to which innocent parties are exposed because of the nature of .
the activity. The danger will be great even though the enterprise is
conducted with every possible precaution. The reasoning here is that
air flights always have a certain element of danger that can not be elim-
inated by taking every precaution.
The second basis for requiring absolute liability is the one-sidedness
of the benefit from the activity and the one-sidedness in the creation
of risks to others." Flying is a hazardous activity that the aircraft owner ,'
benefits from or derives a profit from, and there is no gain to the land-
owner over whose land the airplane flies. Further, the risk to which
the landowner is subjected because of the flight over his land is com-
pletely caused by the aircraft, there being no defense the person on
the ground has to protect either his property or himself if the aircraft
were to plunge down from the sky. The utter helplessness of the
ground victim in avoiding the accident is a strong reason for adopting
absolute liability.
9 Guile v. Swan, 19 Johns, N. Y. 381, 10 Am. Dec. 234 (1822).
10 Margosian v. U. S. Airlines, Inc. 127 F. Supp. 464 (S.D. N.Y. 1955); Halin
v. U. S. Airlines, Inc. 127 F. Supp. 950 (S.D. N.Y. 1954); cf. Van Alstyne v.
Rochester Telephone Corp., 163 Misc. 258, 296 N. Y. Supp. 726 (1937) which was
a non-aviation trespass case.
11 Rochester Gas and Electric Co. v. Dunlop, 148 Misc. 849, 266 N. Y. Supp.
469 (1933).12 D'Aquilla v. Pryor, 122 F. Supp. 346 (S.D. N.Y. 1954) at 346.
13 Of course insurance coverage is the usual method that is used to protect both
the pilot and the owner. Couch, Cyclopedia of Insurance Law § 5 (1956 Supp.)
"Aeroplanes and flying boats have become the subject of insurance in much the
same manner as have automobiles. For instance insurance has been written which
provides indemnity for damage from 'collision' with the earth of any moving or
stationary object."
14 Prosser, Torts § 56 (1941).
15 Ibid.
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The third basis for the common law courts to impose absolute lia-
bility upon the operator of the aircraft is the ability of the type of
enterprise that causes the damage or injury to distribute the loss as
part of the costs to those who receive its benefits.16 The possibility that
the airplanes that one uses for business may trespass on the land of
someone else should be taken into consideration in determining the
rates to charge. Therefore, the aircraft owner, either by setting up a
reserve for such a contingency or by prorating the costs of insurance
protection, can prepare himself for such an eventuality. The land-
owner has no means available for spreading the risk of aircraft damage
because, unlike the aircraft owner who derives a profit from the opera-
tion, the landowner has no one upon whom he can shift the expense
of the aircraft flight because he has no commercial interest in the air-
craft venture. Therefore, as a matter of economics, the aircraft owner
is in a better position to assume the risks of flights over other people's
land.17
In Vold's Strict Liability for Aircraft Crashes and Forced Landings
on Ground Victims Outside of Established Landing Areas, 5 Hast. L. J.
1 (1933), the author presents the argument for absolute liability as
falling within the common law analogy concerning the use of the
property of another for self-protection. Thus, where the emergency
arises, one person may prudently and reasonably use another's property
for the purpose of preserving his own much more valuable interest.
However, he, of course, having taken the benefit, must compensate for
the actual damage caused to the other. This argument covers the case
where there is a deliberate landing upon another's property, but there
are many situations where there is no weighing of values; where, in
fact, the operator has no control over the aircraft. Therefore, the
concept of absolute liability based upon the nature of the activity is
more workable as it covers all circumstances rather than the narrow
limitation of forced landings.
(b) Ultrahazardous Undertaking
The theory that the use of an airplane is an ultrahazardous under-
taking is the position taken by the Restatement, Torts Sec. 520 (1938)
which defines an activity as ultrahazardous if it (a) necessarily involves
a risk of serious harm to the person, land, or chattels of others which
cannot be eliminated by the exercise of the utmost care, and (b) is not
a matter of common usage.
The Restatement expressly includes aviation within the scope of
section 520 because in the comment on Clause (a), it states,
"Aviation in its present stage of development is ultrahazardous
because even the best constructed and maintained aeroplane is so
incapable of complete control that flying creates a risk that the
plane even though carefully constructed, maintained and operated,
16 Ibid.
17 Prentiss v. National Airlines, 112 F. Supp. 306 (D. N.J. 1953). (Subse-
quently settled, so that no appeal was taken.)
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may crash to the injury of persons, structures and chattels on the
land over which the flight is made."
Comment (g) of section 520 declares that both Clauses (a) and
(b) of the definition must be satisfied. The comment maintains that,
unlike automobiles, aviation fulfills the requirement of Clause (b),
uncommon usage, as well as Clause (a). Aviation, section 520 of the
Restatement declares, has not become either a common or an essential
means of transportation. Automobiles are eliminated from ultrahaz-
ardous activity because the use of the automobile has become common-
place and the risk is slight which cannot be eliminated by careful
driving and maintenance.
Restatement, Torts Sec. 519 (1938) makes one who carries on an
ultrahazardous activity liable to another whose person, land, or chattels
he injures through his performance of the ultrahazardous activity.
Although Clause (b) of section 520 is affected by time, as demon-
strated by automobiles being removed from ultrahazardous activity,
jurisdictions that impose absolute liability on the common law do not
consider that air flight (nearly twenty years after the restatement) has
progressed to the point where it is removed from the ultrahazardous
group. 8 This was expressly affirmed in Margosean v. U. S. Airlines,
Inc.'9 In this case, District Judge Byers in 1955 rejected the idea that
the Restatement of Torts, section 520 (b), no longer applies since the
operation of airplanes is now a matter of common usage. Judge Byers
stated:
"It may be fully conceded that many more planes are now oper-
ating than when the text was drawn; if the argument means as I
think it does, that the element of hazard diminishes directly with
the multiplication of air-traffic, it carries its own answer. The more
planes there are in the sky, the more the take-offs and landings, and
therefore the more frequent the exposure to the accidents incident
thereto on the part of the persons and property in the line of pos-
sible misadventure. 20
It appears that advocates of absolute liability on the basis of ultra-
hazardous activity, although paying lip service to the requirements of
section 520 (b) 21 are in reality disregarding the requirement that the
activity be uncommon and novel. Although the Restatement expressly
states that Clauses (a) and (b) both must be satisfied, the weight of
Clause (a) (the risk of serious harm) is carrying Clause (b) (uncom-
mon usage) along, even though there is no longer in fact the situation
of aviation being an uncommon or unessential means of transportation
today.
1s D'Anna v. U. S., 181 F. 2d 335 (4th Cir. 1950) applying Maryland state law
and Parcell v. U. S., 104 F. Supp. 110 (S.D. W.Va. 1951) applying W. Virginia
state law cited the Restatement, Tort § 519,520.
19 127 F. Supp. 464 (S.D. N.Y. 1955).
20 Id. at 467.
21 Restatement, Torts (1938).
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2. Statutory Liability
The statutory basis for absolute liability is embodied in the Uni-
form Aeronautics Acts, section five.22 The Uniform Aeronautics Act
was first drafted in 1922 and approved by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Twenty-four states have at
one time enacted the Uniform Aeronautics Acts. Section five, which
declares that an owner is absolutely liable for damage on land, reads
as follows:
"The owner of every aircraft which is operated over the lands
or waters of this State is absolutely liable for injuries to persons
or property on the land or water beneath, caused by the ascent,
descent or flight of the aircraft, or the dropping or falling of any
object therefrom, whether such owner was negligent or not, unless
the injury is caused in whole or in part by the negligence of the
person injured, or of the owner or bailee of the property injured.
If the aircraft is leased at the time of the injury to person or prop-
erty, both owner and lessee shall be liable, and they may be suedjointly, or either or both of them may be sued separately. An aero-
naut who is not the owner or lessee shall be liable only for the conse-
quences of his own negligence ..."
The Uniform Aeronautics Act is diametrically opposed to the
non-statutory absolute liability by means of trespass. Whereas the
owner is absolutely liable in section 5 and the operator is only liable
for his own negligence, on the basis of absolute liability for trespass,
the operator is always held liable and the owner is not liable when he
can avail himself of a common law defense.28
The Uniform Aeronautics Act, section 5, however, strips the air-
craft owner of all the common law defenses. He is liable even if the
accident was due to an act of God, to an unauthorized act of the pilot,
or if the airplane was bailed to the use of another. The effect of the
statute is to make the infliction of injury or damages by the operation
of an airplane of itself a wrongful act giving rise to liability.24
(a) Constitutionality of Statutory Absolute Liability
The absolute liability of the aircraft owner under section 5 was
attacked as unconstitutional on the grounds that the statute deprived
aircraft owners of their property without due process of law contrary
to the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution,25 and
also as violative of the Interstate Commerce clause of the United States
Constitution.26 The occasion for the attack was the New Jersey statute
22 11 U.L.A. §5.
25 D'Aquilla v. Pryor, 122 F. Supp. 346 (S.D. N.Y. 1954) where the court held
that Connecticut common law was the same as New York and the owner is not
liable for injuries sustained by third parties when the airplane crashed while under
control of bailee.
24 U. S. v. Praylou, 208 F. 2d 291 (4th Cir. 1953) where the court interpreted
South Carolina's statute which was identical to 11 U.L.A. § 5.
25 ... nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; .. ." U. S. Const. Amend. XIV.
26 "The Congress shall have power . . . to regulate commerce ... among the
several States . . ." U. S. Const. Art. I, § 8.
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N.J.S.A. 6:2-7 which adopted section five of the Uniform Aeronautics
Act.2 7 After a series of disastrous airplane crashes at Elizabeth, New
Jersey, the airlines involved attempted to set up a series of defenses
covering act of God, lack of negligence of the airlines, and negligence
of a third party, i.e., the Federal Civil Aeronautics Authority. Because
section 5 of the Uniform Aeronautics Act bars these defenses, the air-
lines claimed the New Jersey statute was unconstitutional.
28
(1) Due Process
Absolute statutory liability was upheld as not being a deprivation
of the owner's property without due process of law. The New Jersey
court pointed out that the statute does not make the owner absolutely
liable for aircraft passengers but only "to persons or property on the
land or water beneath. "29 Further, contributory negligence by the
plaintiff will bar recovery. In addition, the pilot or operator of the
aircraft, if not the owner or lessee, is not to be held absolutely liable.
The court used the analogy of workmen's compensation statutes in
placing the cost of the dangers of the enterprise upon the industry
itself, rather than the completely innocent third party, who, unlike the
owner or passengers, had no interest in the enterprise.a0
Absolute liability is recognized today as due process. Liability
without fault is not a novelty in the law and statutes imposing liability
without fault have been sustained as due process by the United States
Supreme Court.81
As to whether or not absolute liability, even though valid in gen-
eral, may be applicable to the field of aviation, the Prentiss case held
that the operation of aircraft is an ultrahazardous activity.32 To prove
this the court quoted from comments (b) and (d) of the Restatement
of Torts Section 520. 3 3 As added emphasis, the statistics and statements
of the Editor of the Journal of Air Law and Commerce, Professor of
Law, Northwestern University, were introduced by the court.
34
"Persons on the ground (not on a landing area of an established
airport) should be compensated for injuries directly attributable
to the operation of aircraft, irrespective of the aircraft operators'
negligence ..... The imposition of absolute liability by legislation
under such circumstances involves no departure from law as it is
now developing. . . . Important as the continued development of
civil aviation is believed to be, no convincing reason has been pre-
27 N.J.S.A. 6:2-7 was amended to exclude a chattel mortgage, a conditional
vendor or trustee under an equipment trust, of any aircraft, not in possession of
such aircraft from definition of owner. Except for this definition the statutory was
identical to the Uniform Aeronautics Act, § 5.
28 Prentiss v. National Airlines, Inc., Gizzo v. American Airlines, Inc. 112 F.
Supp. 306 (D. N.J. 1953).
29 Prentiss v. National Airlines, supra at 310.
30 Ibid.
31 New York Cent. R. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188, (1916) ; City of Chicago v.
Sturges, 222 U. S. 313, (1911); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, (1932).
32 Prentiss v. National Airlines, supra, at 311.
33 These comments dealt with the lack of complete control of the airplane by
the operator and was discussed in an earlier portion of this writing.
34 Prentiss v. National Airlines, supra, at 312.
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sented why it should be subsidized at the expense of the luckless
victim on the ground who, without participating in aviation in any
way, is injured by an aircraft accident even though not attributable
to the fault of the operator." 85
The court concluded that because statutory absolute liability does
not violate due process and that aviation is within such an ultrahazard
class, the legislature therefore has a right to impose absolute tort liabil-
ity and the statute does not violate the "due process" clause.
(2) Relation to Interstate Commerce
The Uniform Aeronautics Act, Section 5, as reproduced by N.J.S.A.
6:2-7 is not an unreasonable burden upon interstate commerce so as
to be unconstitutional. The provisions of the statute in question have
a reasonable relation to the public welfare.8 6 Besides, the statutory
provisions clearly show that
(a) They do not affect the actual movements of airplanes in inter-
state commerce.
(b) They do not affect the average airplane, even financially as a
tax.
(c) They only affect an airplane owner financially on the occur-
rence of an accident. Such an accident is not the ordinary
result of air travel.
(d) The benefit of the statute does not go to a participant of the
air travel but only to those who are, under ordinary circum-
stances, total strangers to the activity.8Y
The court determined that the effect of the absolute liability statute
was only indirect and casual on interstate commerce. Also the statute
is a rational exercise of the police power and there are a host of cases
that settle this point.38
B. The Application of Rules Governing Ordinary Land Torts
The states that have neither passed statutory absolute liability legis-
lation nor have created absolute liability by judicial decisions, apply
the same rules for tort actions that involve injury to ground inhabitants
by airplanes as they would apply in ordinary tort and negligence actions
upon the land. By adopting the body of law of torts that have been
developed over the centuries to this twentieth century invention, any
basis for analogy must be stretched. Airplanes travel in an entirely
new medium; aircraft flights involve a three-dimensional concept for
which there is no previous comparable phenomenon. The laws of
admiralty were suggested and rejected as possible principles to apply
85 Is Special Aviation Liability Legislation Necessary? Journal of Air Law
and Commerce 167. The author answers the query in the affirmative.
86 Prentiss v. National Airlines, 8upra, at 313.
87 Id. at 314.
88 11 Am. Jur., Constitutional Law, § 265, p. 1002.
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in aviation because maritime law, dealing with a different medium of
travel, is not suitable for air navigation.89
1. Res ipsa loquitur
Because land rules of ordinary torts are adopted in the majority
of jurisdictions, it is obvious that the maxim of res ipsa loquitur must
of necessity play an important role in the process of recovery. The
almost total destruction of the aircraft and death of the airplane's occu-
pants ofttimes prevents proper evaluation of the cause of the disaster.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was first stated in the English
case of Scott v. London and St. Katherine Docks C0.40 where it was held:
"There must be reasonable evidence of negligence. But where
the thing is shown to be under the management of the defendant or
his servants, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of
things does not happen if those who have the management use
proper care, it affords reasonable evidence in the absence of expla-
nation by the defendants, that the accident arose from want of
care."
41
The rule is based in part upon the theory that the defendant,
having custody and exclusive control of the instrumentality which
causes the injury, has the best opportunity of determining the cause
of the accident, and that the injured party has no such knowledge and
is compelled to allege negligence in general terms and to rely upon
the proof of the happening of the accident in order to establish negli-
gence. 4
2
The modern trend is to hold the rule of res ipsa loquitur applicable
to airplane accidents.48
To the extent that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is recognized
and applied in jurisdictions in ordinary negligence action, it is applica-
ble in accidents arising out of aviation accidents where the same reasons
for the rule are applicable. 44
In Kadylak v. O'Brien45 an airplane making a forced landing hit
and killed a boy. It was held that proof of negligence was required
before a recovery could be had for the child's death, but since the
instrumentality that produced the injury was under the control and
89 Fixel, The Law of Aviation § 5 (1948). The thesis had been advanced that
the constitutional grant of admiralty jurisdiction should be construed to embrace
aviation. See Report of the Special Committee on the Law of Aviation, 46 A.B.A.
Rep. 498 (1921). This has not found support in the courts. The Crawford Bros.
No. 2, 215 F. 269 (W.D. Wash. 1914), U. S. v. Batre, 69 F. 2d 673 (C.C.A. 9th,
1934). See also Veeder, The Legal Relation Between Aviation and Admiralty, 2 Air
L. Rev. 29 (1931); Knauth, Aviation and Admiralty, 6 Air L. Rev. 226 (1935).
40 3 H. & C. 596, 159 Eng. Rep. 665 (Ex. 1865).
41 Id. at 667.
42 Truhlicka v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 162 Kan. 535, 178 P. 2d 252 (1947);
U. S. v. Kesinger, 190 F. 2d 529 (10th Cir. 1951).
43 U. S. v. Kesinger, supra (1951); D'Anna v. U. S., 181 F. 2d 335, 337 (4th
Cir. 1950) where an auxiliary gas tank fell from Naval plane. Genero v. Ewing,
176 Wash. 78, 28 P. 2d 116, 118 (1934) where defendant's plane with no one at the
controls ran into plaintiff's building; Seaman v. Curtiss Flying Service, 231 App.
Div. 867, 247 N. Y. S. 251, 253 (1930) which was for death of passenger when
plane crashed.
44Res ipsa loquitur in Aviation Accidents, 6 A.L.R. 2d 528 (1949).
451941 U. S. Av. R. 8 (W.D. Pa.), unreported elsewhere.
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management of the defendant, the defendant should bear'the burden
of proving his freedom from fault in operating a dangerous agency.
It is necessary, as this case indicates, to prove negligence before the
recovery can be permitted.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur cannot be applied by merely
establishing that there was an accident. The doctrine is a rule of
circumstantial evidence which permits the inference of negligence to
be drawn from the occurrence of an accident upon proof of certain
facts.
The cases where the doctrine has been rejected in air crash cases
may be classified into three groups: (1) those holding that the evidence
fails to show that the aircraft was under the exclusive control of the
defendant,46 (2) those holding that it is not an unusual occurrence for
an airplane to crash without the intervention of a human agency,47
and (3) those holding that experience is not sufficiently uniform to
justify a presumption that such accidents do not happen in the absence
of negligence. 48
Actually, those cases where res ipsa loquitur has been rejected have
not been caused by the failure of the doctrine to operate in air crash
cases in general, but because in the particular fact situation one of the
essential elements of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine was missing.
This requirement that all elements be present was pointed out most
emphatically in Williams v. U. S.4 9 In this case a United States Air
Force jet bomber exploded in mid-air. The injuries and damages were
caused by the falling of flaming fuel from the exploded airplane. There
were no survivors of the jet bomber and plaintiffs, relying solely on the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to sustain their burden of showing negli-
gence on the part of the government, introduced no evidence other
than the explosion of the jet bomber in mid-air and the damages that
resulted. The court held that it was not enough that the plaintiffs
showed that the thing which injured them was within the exclusive
control of the defendant.50 Plaintiffs must also show that the accident
would not have occurred in the ordinary course of events if the defend-
ant had exercised due care. 51 Human experience in the particular
46 Towle v. Phillips, 180 Tenn. 121, 172 S.W. 2d 806 (1943) which was not a
case of injury to landowner but for death of passenger in dual control aircraft.
It could not be determined who was at the controls.
47 Smith v. Whitney, 223 N. C. 534, 27 S.E. 2d 442 (1943) for passenger injury.
Boueineau v. Knoxville, 20 Tenn. App. 404, 99 S.W. 2d 577 (1935) where coart said
it was duty of plaintiff to point out the negligence upon which they attributed the
proximate cause of the injury. Here plaintiffs were suing for injuries and death of
passengers in an airplane accident. Herndon v. Gregory, 190 Ark. 707, 81 S.W. 2d
849 (1935), "Practically all cases where the doctrine has been held to apply involve
accidents which could not well have occurred without the intervention of man. ...
In the case of airplanes it is more probable the accident could occur even if in the
ordinary course of things, proper care is used in its control." In this case suit was
brought to recover for the death of a guest in an airplane that crashed.
48 Wilson v. Colonial Air Transport, Inc., 278 Mass. 420, 180 N.E. 212 (1932),
which was a suit by a passenger of an airplane and not by a landowner or a person
on the ground.49 218 F. 2d 473 (5th Cir. 1955).
50 Id. at 476.
51 Ibid.
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situation is often so uniform and well established that it is not necessary
to prove this by extraneous evidence. However, in this particular new
situation, the court had no knowledge, judicial or technical, of what
might cause a jet airplane to explode in mid-air while in flight. Since
there was no evidence introduced by the plaintiffs to show that such
an accident could not occur except for negligence, the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur could not be introduced. There must be evidence of
negligence before the defendant must be required by the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur to explain why he was not negligent.5 2
In general, therefore, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable
where the state requires that the ordinary land rules of tort and negli-
gence be adopted to recover damages for injuries resulting from aircraft
damages on the ground. In the instances where the doctrine has been
rejected, it has been due partially to the degree of development of
aviation at the time of making the decision. In other words, the cases
are made obsolete by the further technical development and the in-
creased familiarity of the judges with the new invention. Another
reason for the rejection in some instances is that the same diversity of
judicial opinion along conservative and judicial lines that exists in the
application of the doctrine in general is reflected in the application
within the same jurisdictions in their treatment of aviation cases also.5 3
The third reason for denying the doctrine is based upon the absence
of a reliable background of experience for determining the balance of
probabilities, as between negligence and natural hazards, as causative
factors.
The first and third reasons are similar in that novelty of air naviga-
tion is the underlying cause for the rejection of res ipsa loquitur. As
has been demonstrated by the experience of the railroads and auto-
mobiles, the attitude of the judiciary toward aviation will follow the
same course as it had towards the other inventions. Eventually the
only reason for refusing to apply res ipsa loquitur will be where the
court would not apply it under the particular circumstances, no matter
what the instrumentality that caused the injury.
The importance of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine in the recovery
by the plaintiff is shown by a statement in the Journal of Air Law
and Commerce54 quoting Dean John H. Wigmore as having found,
after investigation as to aviation accidents, that "not in twenty per cent
of the accidents which have thus far occurred would it have been
possible for the plaintiff to find and produce provable evidence of the
real cause of the accident."
Shifting the burden upon the defendant to explain the cause of the
crash becomes the key to a recovery by the plaintiff in such a situation.
52 Ibid.
53 6 ALR 2d 531 (1949).
54 Vol. 19 No. 2 p. 168.
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2. Defenses
The adoption of the same ordinary rules of torts for injury caused
by aircraft, as are applicable on land, provides the defendant aircraft
owner with the same defenses that are permitted in conventional tort
situations. The defendant has a far greater ability to maintain a
defense in these jurisdictions than he would have in jurisdictions that
enforce absolute liability, because in these jurisdictions the defendant
has no defense except contributory negligence by the plaintiff. Negli-
gence does not have to be shown to make the defendant liable for all
damages.
(a) Act of God
An act of God is a proper defense to an air crash negligence action
where the ordinary rules of land torts have been adopted. 55
In Johnson v. Western Air Express Corp.5 6 it was held that the
disaster occurred because of the unusual forces of nature and that it
could not have been reasonably anticipated, guarded against, or resisted.
The defendant airline corporation was therefore not responsible. This
is in contrast to Prentiss v. National Airlines57 where the court in an
absolute liability state would not even entertain the defense of act of
God.
(b) Bailment
In states where the normal rules applicable for torts govern the
liability of owners, lessees, or operators of aircraft, the fact that the
owner of the aircraft rented or loaned the aircraft to another does not
make the owner liable for injuries in case of bailment where he has
not been negligent."" Only if the owner was negligent himself or if
there was an agency relationship can be held liable for ground damage
caused by the pilot.
The most important case on aircraft bailment is Boyd v. White.59
In this case, which arose in a state that applies the same rules of tort
for aircraft liability as for ordinary tort actions, the owner leased the
airplane to a flying instructor knowing it would be flown by a student
pilot. The student pilot and the instructor were held liable for the
ground damage caused by the negligent operation of airplane but the
court affirmed the nonsuit in favor of the defendant airplane owner.
The California statute read: 60
"For damages caused by a forced landing, the owner or lessee
of the aircraft or the operator thereof shall be liable, as provided by
law."
55 Note, 83 ALR 358 (1933), supplemented by 99 ALR 190 (1935).
56 45 CA 2d 614, 114 p. 2d 688 (1941). This was not a land damage case but
was for death of the famous African explorer as a passenger in the crash of a
passenger airliner.
57 112 F. Supp. 306 (D. N.J. 1953).
58 Note, ALR 2d 1306 (1949).
59 128 CA 2d 641, 276 P. 2d 92 (1954).
60 Now Cal. Pub. Utl. Code § 21403.
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There are no other California statutes referring to liability of bailors
or owners of planes for forced landings.
The court refused to impose any liability because the owner, once
he had leased the plane to the instructor, had no right of control or
interest in its use.
Applying the law of bailment the court applied the general law of
bailment that ". . . bailor is not only not absolutely liable for the acts
of the bailee, but is not liable for the negligence of the bailee, at least
in the absence of knowledge on the part of the bailor that the bailee
is incompetent or reckless." 61
The California court refused to adopt the non-statutory absolute
liability doctrine because the court opposed the continuance of the
viewpoint that aviation is an ultrahazardous activity as expressed in the
American Law Institute, Restatement, Torts Sec. 520 (1938) .62
This view of the California court was also adopted in Nebraska
where the court declared that an airplane is not an inherently danger-
ous instrument, even in flight.6 3
It will be observed that those states that apply the ordinary rules of
land torts to cases involving injury caused by air crashes or forced
landings take the attitude that the thesis of the restatement is no longer
applicable, i.e., aviation is not in the inherently dangerous instru-
mentality category.
(c) Agency Relationship
A defense not available to an owner under the absolute liability
statute is the lack of an agency relationship. Therefore where the
owner can prove that the operator was not performing his agency
function there will be no liability under the ordinary rules of tort.
6 4
"Not only must the pilot of the plane at the time of the injury
have been acting for the owner and within the scope of his employ-
ment, but the injury must have been the proximate result of the
negligence of such pilot."6 5
(d) Proximate Cause of the Accident
The defense that the owner or his agents were not the persons
responsible for the injury is a defense that is permitted in the ordinary
tort liability jurisdictions. The most famous case, a non-aviation case,
is Palsgraf v. Long Island R. R. Co.66 which established that the defend-
ant must be held only for the foreseeable consequences of his own
actions. In addition, "proximate cause" gives the defendant the defense
61 Boyd v. White, 128 CA 2d 641, 276 P. 2d 92, 98 (1954).
62 Id. "... Properly handled by a competent pilot exercising reasonable care,
an airplane is not an inherently dangerous instrument, so that in the absence of
statute the ordinary rules of negligence control, and the owner (or operator) of an
airship is only liable for injury inflicted upon another where such damage is caused
by a defect in the plane or its negligent operation."
63 In re Kinsey's Estate, 152 Neb. 95, 103, 40 N.W. 2d 526, 531 (1949).
64 Spartan Aircraft Co. v. Jamison, 181 Okla. 645, 75 P. 2d 1096 (1938) ; King
v. U. S., 178 F. 2d 320 (5th Cir. 1949), Cert. denied 339 U. S. 964 (1950).
65 Spartan Aircraft Co. v. Jamison, supra, 1099.
66 248 N. Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
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that another actor whom the defendant could not have foreseen or
prevented was responsible for the accident. In other words the owner
can introduce evidence that another party was primarily responsible
for the accident that resulted in the injuries to persons or property
on the earth's surface, thereby shifting the responsibility to the actual
tortfeasor. The absolute liability statutes, of course, do not provide
for any defense other than the contributory negligence of the plaintiff.
It then follows that in an action by the injured party, the owner of the
aircraft cannot escape liability by this defense in jurisdictions that
enforce absolute liability.
II1. THE LAW APPLICABLE TO THE SITUATION
A. Choice of Law
The states that apply the absolute liability doctrine and the states
that follow the ordinary rules of land torts can arrive at diametrically
opposite decisions based upon the same fact situations. This was dem-
onstrated by the analysis of the defenses available to the aircraft owner
in the different jurisdictions. The law that is applied to the tort,
therefore, becomes of paramount importance in determining whether
or not the aircraft owner is liable for injuries sustained by surface
property or persons on the ground.
The law governing torts is the law of the place where the injury
occurred. This conflict of law rule applies with equal force to damage
caused by aircraft as to any other tort.6 7
The Uniform Aeronautics Act, section 7, provides that "all torts,
crimes or other wrongs committed by or to aircraft while in flight over
the state shall be governed by the laws of the state and the question
whether damage occasioned by or to an aircraft while in flight over
the state constitutes a tort, crime, or other wrong by or against the
owner of such aircraft shall be determined by the laws of the state that
the aircraft was flying over."
The Uniform Aeronautics Act is in agreement with the conflict of
laws rule that applies to torts.
The state where the proceedings are brought must follow, the law
where the tort arose because the liability imposed by either the statute
or judicial decisions of the state goes to the substantive rights of the
litigants and is not merely a procedural matter."" That the statutes
and judicial decisions affect the substantive right to recover is borne
out by the fact that in states that impose absolute liability for ground
damage caused by aircraft, the aircraft owner has no defense regardless
of negligence. In states that impose the land tort liabilities, where
neither the owner nor his agent are negligent, the plaintiff has no
cause of action against the owner.
67 Krasnow v. National Airlines, 228 F. 2d 326 (2nd Cir. 1955); Margosian v.
U. S. Airlines, Inc., 127 F. Supp. 464 (S.D. N.Y. 1955).
68 U. S. Const. Art. IV § 1 "Full Faith and Credit Clause."
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However, where the action is brought in a jurisdiction other than
the one in which the tort was committed, it is necessary to prove the
law of the state where the wrong occurred because the court does not
necessarily take judicial notice of the foreign law when counsel did not
indicate at the trial that some foreign law governed.6 9
B. Torts by the Federal Government
The United States Government permits suits against itself for
ground damage and injuiy caused by government aircraft under the
Federal Tort Claims Act.70 28 USCA Sec. 1346 (b) states that:
". .. (district courts) shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil
actions or claims against the United States for money damages,
accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of prop-
erty, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrong-
ful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting
within the scope of his office or employment under circumstances
where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or
omission occurred."
28 USCA Sec. 2674 states:
"The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of
this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, but
shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment or for punitive
damages."
The issue has arisen whether the national government could be
held liable under state statutes which enacted the Uniform Aeronautics
Act because 28 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1346 (b) provides for a remedy where a
government employee has committed "a negligent or wrongful act or
omission." The Uniform Aeronautics Act provides for absolute liabil-
ity irrespective of negligence. In U. S. v. Praylou71 the court held that
even where the state statutes embody the absolute liability doctrine,
the government can be held liable because . . . "infliction of injury
or damages by the operation of an airplane (is) of itself a wrongful act
giving rise to liability."72
The court also stated "... one of the principal purposes of the
legislation was to eliminate the necessity for the passage of private
acts, which had consumed so much of the time of Congress; and it is
not consonant with such purpose that Congress should have intended
to exclude from the coverage of the act liability arising from operations
of the sort here involved merely because under state law the liability
for injury was made absolute and not dependent upon negligence." 78
As a further reason that the national government is liable without
negligence in states that have applied absolute liability for damage
69 Krasnow v. National Airlines, 228 F. 2d 326, 327 (2nd Cir. 1955).
70 U. S. v. Caidys, 194 F. 2d 762 (10th Cir. 1952).
71208 F. 2d 291 (4th Cir. 1953).
721d. at 293.
73 Id. at 294.
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done to surface property and persons by aircraft, the court pointed out
that to hold the government liable in those states only where negligence
was shown, and to hold private individuals to the absolute liability of
the statute would be contrary to the requirements of 28 U.S.C.A. Sec.
2674 that requires the United States to be liable to the same extent as
a private individual under the circumstances.74
Thus governmental liability for damages to surface property or
injuries to persons on the ground is permitted under the same circum-
stances as individual persons are liable, and the law of the state where
the tort occurred governs the liability of the federal government also.
C. Classification of States
1. Six states at the present time have retained the Absolute Liabil.
ity Statute of the Uniform Aeronautics Act which makes the owner and
lessee absolutely liable but makes the pilot only liable for his own
negligence. They are:
Delaware; Del. Code Ann. tit. 2, Sec. 305 (1953)
Minnesota; M.S.A. Sec. 360.012 (4)
New Jersey; N.J.S.A. 6:2-7 (Supp. 1955)
North Dakota; N.D. Rev. Code, tit. 2, C. 0305
South Carolina; Code of Laws of South Carolina of 1952 Sec. 2-6
Tennessee; Williams' Tenn. Code Ann. Sec. 2720
2. Seven states repealed statutes that incorporated the Absolute
Liability Provision of the Uniform Aeronautical Act.
Maryland Laws 1949, c. 422 repealed
Maryland Laws 1927, c. 637
Nevada Statute 1947, c. 141 repealed
Nevada Comp. Laws Sec. 279 (1929)
Rhode Island Acts 1940, c. 851 Sec. 22 repealed
Rhode Island Acts 1929, c. 1435
North Carolina Session Laws 1947, c. 1069 s. 3 repealed
Sessions Laws 1929, c. 190, s. 4
South Dakota Code Sec. 2.0305 (1952 Supp.) repealed
South Dakota Session Laws 1925, c. 6
Vermont Laws 1951, No. 110 repealed
Vermont Laws 1923 No. 155 Sec. 5
Wisconsin Statutes Sec. 114.05 (1949) repealed
Wisconsin Laws 1929, c. 348
These states apparently have considered that aeronautics no longer
fulfills the requirements for absolute liability. Aeronautics has made
tremendous strides in the intervening thirty odd years that these abso-
lute liability statutes were passed. The Restatement, Torts Sec. 520
(1938) requires that the ultrahazardous activity is such that can not
be eliminated by the exercise of the utmost care and is not a matter of
common usage. The elimination of either requirement removes the
74M. at 295; of. Indian Towing Co. v. U. S., 350 U. S. 61 (1955) which is not
an aviation case.
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activity from the ultrahazardous category. These states consider avia-
tion has progressed to the point where one or both of these require-
ments no longer is applicable. The same course of development
followed the automobile which the Restatement once classified as ultra-
hazardous, but through technical improvements and common usage
outgrew the classification.
3. Eight states have statutes that apply the ordinary rules of negli-
gence common to land torts:
Arizona; Ariz. Code Ann. Sec. 480111 (1955 Supp.)
Arkansas; Ark. Stat. Ann. Sec. 74-110 (1955 Supp.)
California; West's, Ann. Cal. Codes, Public Utilities, Sec. 21403
(1956)
Idaho; Idaho Code Ann. Sec. 21-205 (1948)
Missouri; No. Rev.,Stat., 305.040 (1955)
Pennsylvania; 2 PS Sec. 1469 (1955 Supp.)
South Dakota; S.D. Code Sec. 2.0305 (1952)
Vermont; Vt. Laws 1951 No. 110
Those states applying the ordinary rules of torts, do not hold the
owner absolutely liable unless there is negligence shown that can be
imputed to the owner.
4. Twenty-six states have no statutory provisions on the liability
of an owner for surface damage and injuries to persons on the ground.
They are alphabetically: Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida,
Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New
York, North Carolina (by virtue of repealing the statute), Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, T.exas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and West
Virginia.
In these states the legislature has not passed any laws pertaining to
the liability of aircraft owners and therefore the judicial decisions
based upon the common law control. This does not prevent incon-
sistent decisions because the courts then either adopt the absolute
liability rules of tort or negligence depending upon whether the court
considers the activity ultrahazardous or not.
5. Five states have passed statutes creating rebuttable presumption
of liability against the aircraft owner and lessee. They are:
Georgia; Ga. code Sec. 11-105 (1933)
Maryland, Md. Ann. Code Gen. Laws Art. IA Sec. 9 (1951)
Nevada, Nev. Comp. Laws Sec. 279
Rhode Island, R.I. Acts, c. 851, Sec. 3 (1940), and
Wisconsin, Wis. Stat. Sec. 114.05 (1949) which, besides creating
the rebuttable presumption against the owner, also includes
the pilot.
By creating rebuttable presumptions of liability these states have
placed the burden upon the owner to establish that neither he nor his
agents or employees were negligent. This eases the plaintiff's case as
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it is extremely difficult to determine the cause of an aircraft accident
when the plane is destroyed and the personnel are killed.
6. Two states impose absolute liability on the owner and lessee in
the case of forced landings only. They are:
Montana, Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. Sec. 1-603 (1947) and
Wyoming, Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. Sec. 30-207 (1945).
In these two states the rules of law applicable to ordinary torts on
land apply as to other types of crashes and the dropping of objects
from planes.
IV. CONCLUSION
The liability of aircraft owners and operators for surface damage
and injury to individuals on the ground is by no means uniform
throughout the forty-eight states. The original tendency toward adopt-
ing the Uniform Aeronautics Act as proposed by the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has been reversed.
Today only six states have retained the section of the Uniform Aero-
nautics Act that provided for absolute liability, although other sections
of the Uniform Aeronautics Act that do not refer to tort liability have
been widely adopted. Seven states have repealed the absolute liability
section.
The majority of states have no statutory provisions regarding the
damage or injury inflicted by aircraft upon the property or inhabitants
on the earth below. This leaves the matter up to the state and federal
courts within the states to formulate the body of law of aircraft damage
to the earth's surface. Unfortunately litigation on the subject is meagre.
One reason for this is that many accidents are at airports or desolate
locations where no damage is done to ground surface. Another reason
is that most of the aircraft cases that do cause damage to land or persons
on the ground are settled outside of court so that no judicial decision
is recorded. This is in large amount due to the fact that most commer-
cial aircraft owners insure their aircraft so that they look to their
insurance companies to pay any damages they cause while operating
their airplanes. In addition, commercial aircraft owners prefer their
insurance companies to compensate an injured party without litigation
because the unfavorable publicity is deleterious to the airlines. The
traveling public is more sensitive to aircrashes than to accidents involv-
ing any other medium of transportation. Consequently, the desire to
avoid harmful public notice is a strong deterrent to litigation.
The same general facts are applied by the courts that hold that
there is a non-statutory absolute liability as are applied by the courts
that declare that there is no absolute liability. Both maintain that the
increased use of aircraft support their different position. Those judges,
who deny the aircraft owner any common law defense where his air-
plane, by crashing or forced landings, has caused injury to ground
inhabitants or property, state that the increased use of aircraft intensi-
fies the problem of air crashes. The judges who refuse to recognize
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absolute liability under the same circumstances state that the increased
use of aircraft removes aircraft from the category of ultrahazardous
activity.
Aviation is no longer ultrahazardous because neither of the two
concurrent requirements as stated in the Restatement of Torts for
being in this classification is any longer valid, i.e., there is no risk of
serious harm which cannot be eliminated by the exercise of the utmost
care and airplane flights are now a matter of common usage. The
Restatement of Torts, sec. 520, comment (g) provides that if either of
the two requirements for ultrahazardous activity has been eliminated
by progress, then the absolute liability of ultrahazardous activities
should no longer be imposed.
Despite the consideration of whether or not aircraft operation is an
ultra-hazardous activity, the application of absolute liability, either
statutory or non-statutory for damage to land or injury to persons on
the ground, has more of the elements of justice than do the ordinary
rules of negligence.
Where either of two innocent parties must suffer, the airplane
owner or the landowner or individual upon the ground, there are more
social-economic reasons for holding the airplane owner liable for the
aircraft damage than to leave the surface inhabitant remediless in
some situations. The aircraft owner set the stage for the tort by the
acquisition of the aircraft. The person on the surface had no relation-
ship with the aircraft until the aircraft caused the tort. It was therefore
not reasonable to expect him to take any measures to protect himself.
On the other hand the aircraft owner either derives pleasure if he is a
private plane owner, or else uses his aircraft for commercial gain if he
is a commercial airline operator. It is within his power to protect
himself either by insurance or by spreading the risk of possible acci-
dents by prorating the cost among all the shippers and passengers that
use his services. In that way, similar to workmen's compensation laws
in that the damages, regardless of negligence, are reflected in the
economic structure of the industry, the aircraft owner will bear the
full responsibility for all damages committed upon the earth's surface.
Another factor that should not be overlooked in favor of uniform
laws throughout the states on tort liability of aircraft owners is the
tremendous speeds at which advanced aircraft travel. Progress in air-
craft propulsion has been spectacular. It is incongruous that a fraction
of a second will take an aircraft over a different state and thereby
change his liability. Liability should not be predicated on mere chance.
An aircraft owner in the future will have little power to determine in
what territory his aircraft may inflict damage. Only by uniform laws
can the rights and obligations of all parties be determined in advance.
